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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The debate over the necessity, substance, and form of the proposed
e-Discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules)
has been ongoing for over four years. 1 Since the Duke Conference
convened in May 2010, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
the Civil Rules (Committee) has been working to address many of the
perceived shortcomings in the current Rules regime.2 Their efforts have
not been conducted in a vacuum. Interest groups representing parties on
*

Philip Favro is Senior Discovery Counsel, Recommind, Inc.; J.D., Santa Clara
University School of Law, 1999; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young University,
1994. An earlier version of this article was first published by the Electronic Discovery &
Digital Evidence Journal of the American Bar Association. Philip Favro, The New ESI
Sanctions Framework Under The Proposed Rule 37(e) Amendments, EDDE J., Summer
2014, at 12–19, available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0
CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fapps.americanbar.org%2Fdch%2Fthedl.cfm%3Ffile
name%3D%2FST203001%2Frelatedresources%2FEDDE_JOURNALvolume5_issue3.pdf&ei=pzKPVPeVA9KpogTR9oCoDA&usg=AFQjCNHpsxbsPwzvN
EQ7Ku--x8m3x3oydw&sig2=gSNo1bbZeqtfCyHf2A2j0g&bvm=bv.81828268,d.cGU,
archived at http://perma.cc/JKJ9-R6RY.
1

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 13–14,
app. B-1 to B-2 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter SEPT. ‘14 REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/S4YH-RF9T.
2

Id. at 13–14, app. B-2.
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either side of the “v” in litigation, the U.S. Department of Justice, and
even individual federal judges have lobbied the Committee in an effort to
shape the final form of the proposed amendments.3 This process, while
both lengthy and necessary, may be reaching its closing stages. With the
Judicial Conference of the United States having approved the Rules
amendment package in September 2014, the proposed changes appear to
be on track for implementation by December 1, 2015.4
[2] Viewed holistically, the proposed changes are designed to usher in a
new era of proportional discovery, increased cooperation, reduced
gamesmanship, and more active judicial case management. 5 For many
litigants the amendments of greatest significance are those affecting Rule
37(e).6 If enacted, the changes to Rule 37(e) would provide a uniform
national standard regarding the issuance of severe sanctions to address
spoliation of electronically stored information (ESI). 7 They would also
3

See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 95-305, 331-411 (May 2, 2014) [hereinafter
MAY ’14 REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/S
T2014-05.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6UFS-XLFQ (summarizing the nature of the
comments the Committee received on the published versions of the proposed Rules
amendments).
4

See Thomas Y. Allman, THE CIVIL RULES PACKAGE AS APPROVED BY THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.theediscoveryblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/2014CommentsonRulePackage.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/QVF2-GPD4 (discussing the timetable for approving and enacting the
Rule amendments).
5

See Philip J. Favro, A Comprehensive Look at the Newly Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 UTAH BAR J. 38, 38–41 (2013).
6

See Raymond M. Ripple & Krystle Guillory Tadesse, Proposed Amendment to FRCP
Rule 37 Addresses Sanctions for Failure to Preserve ESI, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 21,
2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/05/21/proposed-amendment-to-frcp-rule-37addresses-sanct, archived at http://perma.cc/8BA6-BCY9.
7

See Favro, supra note 5, at 42.
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introduce a new framework for determining whether sanctions of any
nature should be imposed for ESI preservation shortcomings. 8 Counsel,
clients, and the courts should all be aware of the impact these changes
could have in litigation and on client information governance programs.9
[3] In this article, I will analyze these issues. After covering the
deficiencies with the current version of Rule 37(e) in Part II, I consider in
Part III the new sanctions framework under the proposed amendments.
This includes an analysis of the factors parties would be required to satisfy
in order to justify the imposition of sanctions. I also describe the severe
measures calculated to remediate the most harmful ESI preservation
failures, along with lesser sanctions designed to cure prejudice stemming
from less egregious forms of spoliation. In Part IV, I focus on some key
questions about the Rule 37(e) revisions that remain unanswered and that
will likely be resolved only by motion practice. This includes, among
other things, a discussion of how a revised Rule 37(e) might apply to
failures to preserve ESI stored with cloud computing providers.
II. THE NEED FOR REVISIONS TO RULE 37(e)
[4] The Committee has spent countless hours considering the overpreservation of ESI and the appropriate standard of culpability required to
impose sanctions for its spoliation.10 Even though the current iteration of
Rule 37(e) is supposed to provide guidance on these issues, amendments
were deemed necessary given the inherent limitations with the rule.11

8

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-59 to B-62.

9

See Philip J. Favro, Getting Serious: Why Companies Must Adopt Information
Governance Measures to Prepare for the Upcoming Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 20 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 5, ¶¶ 32–36 (2014) [hereinafter Getting Serious],
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i2/article5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LUN9-T76D.
10

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-14 to B-15.

11

Id. at app. B-58.
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[5] As it stands, Rule 37(e) safeguards litigants from discovery
sanctions when the good faith, programmed operation of their computer
systems automatically eliminates ESI.12 Nevertheless, the rule has largely
proved ineffective as a national standard.13 While there are many reasons
that could explain its futility, three problems predominate in the present
version of the rule.
[6] First, Rule 37(e) did not expressly abrogate the negligence standard
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit implemented for
severe sanctions involving preservation failures under Residential Funding
Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.14 By allowing Residential Funding to
remain in effect, courts in the Second Circuit and beyond are free to
impose adverse inference instructions or order other doomsday sanctions
for negligent spoliation of ESI. 15 With the Second Circuit—one of the
epicenters of U.S. litigation—following a sanctions touchstone that
generally varies from the rest of the country, the rule has failed to become
a uniform national standard for ESI sanctions.16
12

Getting Serious, supra note 9, at ¶ 27.

13

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-58; see also Hawley v. Mphasis Corp.,
302 F.R.D. 37, 47, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (describing that the purpose of the amendments is
“to replace the disparate treatment of preservation/sanctions issues in different circuits by
adopting a single standard”).
14

Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir.
2002); see also SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-17 to B-18, B-65.
15

See, e.g., Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart, 945 F. Supp. 2d 494, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(relying on Residential Funding to impose an adverse inference instruction as a sanction
for the plaintiffs’ grossly negligent spoliation of ESI).
16

See Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has the Rule 37(e) Safe Harbor
Advanced Best Practices for Information Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 317,
328–29, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Sea Change] (discussing the Committee’s intent to
establish the present version of Rule 37(e) as a national standard when it was
implemented in 2006). The Second Circuit’s negligence standard is increasingly viewed
as an anachronistic rule given the current challenges associated with ESI preservation.
See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-18 (observing, among other things, that
because “ESI is more easily lost than tangible evidence, . . . the sanction of an adverse

4
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[7] The second reason Rule 37(e) has failed as a so-called “safe harbor”
from sanctions is the emphasis the 2006 Committee note placed on
requiring litigants to stop the routine destruction of ESI once a
preservation duty attached.17 While litigants may be required to suspend
particular aspects of their electronic information systems once a
preservation duty is triggered, this is not the exclusive or the determinative
factor in every sanctions analysis.18 For instance—as U.S. District Judge
Paul Grimm emphasized in Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.—a
court should also consider as part of that analysis the “reasonableness and
proportionality” of a party’s efforts to preserve relevant ESI. 19
Nevertheless, most courts applying Rule 37(e) have instead generally
focused on whether and when a party suspended particular aspects of its
computer systems after a preservation duty attached. 20 This has led to
sanctions rulings that are out of step with mainline ESI preservation
jurisprudence.21

inference instruction imposes a heavy penalty for losses that are likely to become
increasingly frequent as ESI multiplies”).
17

See Sea Change, supra note 16, at 327–28.

18

Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley II), 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D.
Md. 2010).
19

Id. (observing that an “assessment of reasonableness and proportionality should be at
the forefront of all inquiries into whether a party has fulfilled its duty to preserve relevant
evidence”).
20

See Sea Change, supra note 16, at 327–28.

21

See, e.g., In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86101, at *219–20 (W.D. La. June 23, 2014) (issuing an adverse inference
instruction against one of the defendants for its failure to preserve relevant ESI and
holding that a general litigation hold issued in an unrelated products liability suit filed
nine years earlier had given rise to a duty to preserve relevant ESI in the instant
litigation); Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1191
(D. Utah 2009) (finding that industry-related litigation that was initiated years before the
lawsuit was filed against the defendant should have “sensitized” the defendant to the

5
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[8] The third factor contributing to the futility of Rule 37(e) is that
courts have frequently used their inherent authority to bypass the rule’s
protections. 22 This is because Rule 37(e) only applies to conduct that
occurred during the litigation.23 It does not govern pre-litigation activities
such as the destruction of ESI that occurred before the commencement of
litigation.24 As a result, courts have often wielded their inherent powers to
fashion remedies for ESI destruction free from the rule’s present
constraints.25
[9] With varying preservation standards, the inordinate focus on one
factor in the preservation analysis, and the ease with which the rule’s
protections can be bypassed, there can be little doubt as to why a revised
version of Rule 37(e) is needed.

reasonable anticipation of litigation and that its subsequent failure to preserve relevant
ESI merited sanctions).
22

Thomas Y. Allman, Dealing with Spoliation in the Federal Rules (Again): The
Proposed Amendment to Rule 37(e) at 5, IAALS/NJC E-DISCOVERY SUMMIT 2013 (Sept.
19–20, 2013), available at
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/EDiscovery_Panel_2_Preservation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/72GB-U82V.
23

Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196, n.3 (D.S.C. 2008); see also Rimkus
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611–12 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(delineating the nature and scope of the court’s inherent authority to issue sanctions and
its interplay with Rule 37(e)).
24

Nucor, 251 F.R.D. at 196, n.3 (“Rule 37(e)’s plain language states that it only applies
to sanctions imposed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g., a sanction made
under Rule 37(b) for failing to obey a court order). Thus, the rule is not applicable when
the court sanctions a party pursuant to its inherent powers.”).
25

See, e.g., id.; see also Escobar v. Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72706,
at *51–52, n.5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007) (describing the circumstances under which
courts may exercise their inherent authority).
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III. THE PROPOSED RULE 37(e) AMENDMENTS
[10] The proposed amendments to Rule 37(e) are designed to address
these issues by providing a straightforward framework for the issuance of
any sanctions stemming from failures to preserve relevant ESI. 26 They
also encourage courts to draw on a wide range of factors to fashion
sanctions awards that cure prejudice caused by less harmful forms of ESI
spoliation. 27 In addition, the proposed changes establish “a uniform
standard in federal court” for the imposition of severe remedial measures
resulting from ESI preservation failures.28
A. The New Sanctions Framework
[11] The Committee has established a set of requirements in the proposed
rule that must be satisfied before a court could impose sanctions on a
litigant for failing to preserve ESI.29 The reason for doing so is to ensure
sanctions for preservation failures are based on the designated criteria and
not the potentially arbitrary use of a court’s inherent powers:
New Rule 37(e) . . . . authorizes and specifies measures a
court may employ if information that should have been
preserved is lost, and specifies the findings necessary to
justify these measures. It therefore forecloses reliance on
inherent authority or state law to determine whether
measures should be used.30
[12] The prerequisites a party must satisfy when moving for sanctions
26

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-56 to B-57.

27

See id. at app. B-63 to B-64.

28

Id. at app. B-65.

29

See id. at app. B-56 to B-57, B-61 to B-62.

30

Id. at app. B-58 (emphasis added).
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under the amended Rule 37(e) proposal are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Relevant ESI “should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation,”
Relevant ESI was “lost,”
The party charged with safeguarding the lost ESI “failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve” the information, and
The lost ESI “cannot be restored or replaced through
additional discovery.”31

[13] While the first two steps essentially reflect existing common law
requirements,32 the third step includes a key notion memorialized in Victor
Stanley II and Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata: preservation
efforts must be analyzed through the lens of reasonableness. 33 This is a
significant step since it would oblige courts to examine preservation issues
with a broader perspective and not focus exclusively on whether and when
the party modified aspects of its electronic information systems. 34
Moreover, it would direct preservation questions away from a mythical
standard of perfection that has unwittingly crept into discovery
jurisprudence over the past several years.35 Instead of punishing parties
that somehow failed to preserve every last e-mail that could conceivably
be relevant, the rule would essentially require a common sense
31

Id. at app. B-56.

32

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-59.

33

Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010); Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc.
v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (observing that reasonableness
is the touchstone of the preservation analysis); see also SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1,
at app. B-59 to B-62.
34

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-59 to B-62.

35

See id. at app. B-61 (“This rule recognizes that ‘reasonable steps’ to preserve suffice; it
does not call for perfection.”); Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 604, 615,
631 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that the Rules “do not require perfection” and discussing
related authorities).

8
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determination of the issues based on a benchmark—reasonableness—with
which courts and counsel are familiar.36
[14] The fourth and final provision is significant since it would prevent
the imposition of sanctions where there is essentially no harm to the
moving party given the availability of replacement evidence.37
B. Severe Sanctions vs. Curative Measures
[15] To obtain the most severe measures under Rule 37(e)(2), the moving
party must additionally demonstrate that the alleged spoliator “acted with
the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the
litigation.” 38 This specific intent requirement is designed to create a
uniform national standard by ensuring severe sanctions are imposed only
for the most flagrant violations of ESI preservation duties. 39 These
violations appear to include bad faith destructions of ESI that occur in
connection with the instant lawsuit. 40 They do not, however, include
negligent or grossly negligent conduct.41 The draft Committee note makes
clear that the Rule 37(e) amendments “reject[] cases such as Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2002),
that authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of
negligence or gross negligence.”42

36

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613.

37

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-62 (“[i]f the information is restored or
replaced, no further measures should be taken.”).
38

Id. at app. B-56 to B-57.

39

See id. at app. B-64 to B-65.

40

See id. app. B-17 (“This intent requirement is akin to bad faith.”).

41

See id. at app. B-65.

42

Id.
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[16] The severe sanctions a court could issue under Rule 37(e)(2) are
limited to dismissing the case, entering default judgment, or “instruct[ing]
the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to
the party.”43 Alternatively, a court could presume that the lost ESI was
unfavorable to the alleged spoliator.44 Nevertheless, a court is under no
obligation to order any of these measures even if the specific intent
requirement is satisfied.45 As the Committee cautions in the draft note,
“[t]he remedy should fit the wrong, and the severe measures authorized . .
. should not be used when the information lost was relatively unimportant
or lesser measures . . . would be sufficient to redress the loss.”46
[17] If the moving party cannot satisfy the specific “intent to deprive”
requirement, the court could then resort to curative measures under Rule
37(e)(1) to address prejudice resulting from the loss of the ESI. 47 The
sanctions a court could order pursuant to that provision would be “no
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice” to the aggrieved party. 48
That wording was drafted broadly to ensure that jurists would have
sufficient discretion to craft remedies that could ameliorate the prejudice.49
While the precise range of these remedies is not delineated in the rule, a
Committee report and the draft Committee note suggest the remedies
could include the following:

43

SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-56 to B-57.

44

See id.

45

See id. at app. B-67.

46

Id.

47

Id., at app. B-55 to B-57.

48

Id.

49

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-63 to B-64 (“The range of such
measures is quite broad . . . [; m]uch is entrusted to the court’s discretion.”).

10
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“[P]reclude a party from presenting evidence,”50
“[D]eem some facts as having been established,” 51
“[P]ermit the parties to present evidence and argument
to the jury regarding the loss of information,”52
“[G]ive the jury instructions to assist in its evaluation
of such evidence or argument, other than instructions to
which subdivision (e)(2) applies,”53 or
“[E]xclude a specific item of evidence to offset
prejudice caused by failure to preserve other evidence
that might contradict the excluded item of evidence.”54

[18] Thus, a moving party could very well obtain weighty penalties
against an alleged spoliator even if it is unable to establish the specific
intent to deprive.55 Nevertheless, the draft Committee note establishes that
any such sanctions must be tailored so they do not equal or exceed the
severe measures of Rule 37(e)(2).56
IV. KEY ISSUES FOR MOTION PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW RULE 37(e)
[19] While the new Rule 37(e) proposal addresses the main problems
associated with the current rule, there are several questions about the
50

MAY ‘14 REPORT, supra note 3, at 312.

51

Id.

52

SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-64.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id. at app. B-63 to B-64; see also MAY ‘14 REPORT, supra note 3, at 312.

56

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-64 (“Care must be taken, however, to
ensure that curative measures under subdivision (e)(1) do not have the effect of measures
that are permitted under subdivision (e)(2) only on a finding of intent to deprive another
party of the lost information’s use in the litigation.”).

11
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revised rule that remain unanswered and will likely be the subject of
vigorous motion practice. I will consider three of those questions in this
section.
A. What Are “Reasonable Steps to Preserve” ESI?
[20] One of the principal battlegrounds under the revised version of Rule
37(e) will certainly involve deciphering the meaning of “reasonable steps
to preserve” ESI.57 This is because the “reasonable steps” provision is an
express—though undefined—prerequisite for obtaining sanctions.58 This
is confirmed by the wording of the draft Committee note: “Because the
rule calls only for reasonable steps to preserve, it is inapplicable when the
loss of information occurs despite the party’s reasonable steps to
preserve.” 59 Thus, a party who employs “reasonable steps” to keep
relevant ESI cannot be sanctioned for its loss.60
[21] However, as to the precise meaning of “reasonable steps,” the
Committee provides only general guidance. For example, the draft note
suggests sanctions may not be appropriate if the destroyed ESI is either
outside of a preserving party’s control or has been wiped out by
circumstances (e.g., flood, fire, hackers, viruses, etc.) beyond the party’s
control. 61 Nevertheless, the note does not suggest these force majeure
circumstances are an absolute defense to a sanctions request. 62 Instead, it
advises courts to view the context of the destruction and what steps the
preserving party could reasonably have taken to prepare for the problem
57

Id. at app. B-56.

58

Id. at app. B-56, B-61.

59

Id. at app. B-61.

60

See id. (“Because the rule calls only for reasonable steps to preserve, it is inapplicable
when the loss of information occurs despite the party’s reasonable steps to preserve.”).
61

See id.

62

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-61.

12
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before it occurred. 63 However, the Committee acknowledges that
engaging in this type of hindsight analysis has its limitations.64
[22] The note also suggests that the range of a party’s preservation efforts
should be tempered by proportionality standards. 65 However, as U.S.
Magistrate Judge James Francis observed in Orbit One Communications,
Inc. v. Numerex Corp., proportionality is an “amorphous” and “highly
elastic” concept that may not “create a safe harbor for a party that is
obligated to preserve evidence.” 66
Therefore, while notions of
proportionality may factor into the preservation analysis, it is unlikely they
alone will determine the issue of “reasonable steps to preserve.”67
[23] In the absence of meaningful direction on this issue, courts will
likely turn to existing case law to help guide their decision on whether a
party has taken “reasonable steps” to retain ESI. 68 To be sure, the

63

See id. at app. B-61 to B-62 (“Courts may, however, need to assess the extent to which
a party knew of and protected against such risks.”).
64

See id. at app. B-59 (cautioning generally about the limited perspective that hindsight
provides into the nature of a party’s conduct).
65

See id. at app. B-61 to B-62; see also Philip J. Favro & Derek P. Pullan, New Utah
Rule 26: A Blueprint for Proportionality Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 952 (2012) (citing authorities holding that preservation
efforts “must be viewed through the lens of proportionality” and not just the
“kaleidoscope of relevance”).
66

Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436, n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
67

See Pippins v. KPMG L.L.P., No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116427 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 F.R.D. 245, 255–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(rejecting the defendant’s proportionality-based argument because it failed to consider
reasonable conditions upon its request to retain only excerpts of its preserved ESI).
68

See Sea Change, supra note 16, at 334–39 (discussing various cases).
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jurisprudence on this issue is far from uniform.69 Nevertheless, there are
many cases that delineate the acceptable boundaries of preservation
conduct.70 How those cases are applied under the revised Rule 37(e) will
turn—as they always have—on the facts of the case, 71 the quality of
counsel’s advocacy,72 and the court’s perception of the issues.73
B. What Does “Intent to Deprive” Mean?
[24] Another likely area of dispute between litigants will be on the
69

Compare Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746–48 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding an adverse inference instruction was appropriate given the defendant’s failure to
suspend its 90-day audio recording retention policy, which resulted in the destruction of
relevant evidence), with Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 899–902 (8th Cir.
2004) (holding an adverse inference instruction was not proper despite the defendant’s
failure to suspend its 90-day audio recording retention policy, which could have resulted
in the destruction of relevant evidence). See also Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. 497, 523
(D. Md. 2010) (observing “in terms of what a party must do to preserve potentially
relevant evidence, case law is not consistent across the circuits, or even within individual
districts.”).
70

See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(approving information retention policies that eliminate documents for “good
housekeeping” purposes); Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572–73
(D. Utah 2012) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions since the evidence at issue was
destroyed pursuant to defendants’ “good faith business procedures”).
71

See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (explaining a preservation “analysis depends heavily on the facts and
circumstances of each case and cannot be reduced to a generalized checklist of what is
acceptable or unacceptable.”); see also Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135,
162 (2d Cir. 2012) (reasoning that a “case-by-case approach” is the preferred method for
determining the appropriate remedial measures for failures to preserve relevant
information).
72

See, e.g., Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998)
(affirming an order of judgment against the plaintiff despite the defendant’s destruction
of relevant evidence and expressing “surprise” at the “perplexing failure” of the
plaintiff’s counsel to formally move for discovery sanctions).
73

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-59 to B-60.
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meaning of the “intent to deprive” requirement of revised Rule 37(e)(2).74
While the draft Committee note makes clear that this specific intent
requirement does not include negligent or grossly negligent conduct, 75 the
question confronting clients, counsel, and the courts is what conduct does
it refer to?
[25] The Committee report issued in connection with the Rule 37(e)
proposed amendments explains that the “intent requirement is akin to bad
faith.” 76 Despite this straightforward explanation, the draft Committee
note does not take such a restrictive view.77 Instead, the note indicates
that sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) are limited “to instances of intentional
loss or destruction.”78 Conduct that is “intentional” and which results in
the spoliation of ESI is not necessarily tantamount to bad faith. 79 Indeed,
that intentional conduct is a lesser standard than bad faith was confirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit many years
ago.80 In addressing a document spoliation question, the Seventh Circuit
noted the distinction between bad faith and intentional conduct: “[t]hat the
documents were destroyed intentionally no one can doubt, but ‘bad faith’
means destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse information.”81
74

Id. at app. B-56 to B-57.

75

Id. at app. B-65.

76

Id. at app. B-17.

77

See id. at app. B-65.

78

Id.

79

See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“In
determining that a spoliator acted in bad faith, a district court must do more than state the
conclusion of spoliation and note that the document destruction was intentional.”).
80

See Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998)
(explaining the differences between bad faith and intentional conduct in connection with
a defendant’s destruction of relevant information).
81

Id.
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[26] If the “intent to deprive” requirement does encompass lesser forms
of ESI spoliation than bad faith, the question then becomes what is the
level of conduct punishable under Rule 37(e)(2)? The answer is that
“intentional” spoliations may very well include instances where parties
have been reckless or willful in their destructions of ESI. 82 Whether that
conduct is sufficient to justify the severe measures that a revised Rule
37(e) authorizes will once again turn on the nature and circumstances
surrounding the spoliation.83 In other words, the courts will again be left
to sort out the meaning of a key provision from the rule.84
C. How Would Rule 37(e) Apply to Cloud Computing
Preservation Failures?
[27] A third unanswered question is how the revised Rule 37(e) might
apply in the context of cloud computing. This is a particularly significant
issue given that many organizations and individuals have moved or will
move their data to cloud-based storage platforms. 85 Even though
82

See generally Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“willfulness involves
intentional or reckless conduct that is so unreasonable that harm is highly likely to
occur”).
83

See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex.
2010).
84

See generally Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010) (discussing cases and
the challenges associated with evidence preservation confronting courts and
organizational litigants).
85

See Ned Smith, Why More Businesses Are Using Cloud Computing, CNBC (July 25,
2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48319526/Why_More_Businesses_Are_Using_Cloud_Computi
ng, archived at http://perma.cc/JB7Q-D2ES (“More than eight in 10 companies currently
use some form of cloud solution, and more than half plan to increase cloud investments
by 10 percent or more this year . . . [and] more than half of micro (one to nine employees)
and small (10 to 99 employees) businesses use cloud-based business productivity
applications.”); see also Nicole Black, Introduction, GLOBAL CLOUD SURVEY REPORT
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petabytes of data are now being stored in the cloud, there are few lawyers
who possess the expertise or understanding required to preserve and
produce that data in discovery.86 These factors suggest cloud-related ESI
preservation breakdowns should be expected in the coming years.87 Given
these circumstances, how should courts address cloud preservation
breakdowns under the amended Rule?
[28] One recent case that provides some insight into the issues is Brown
v. Tellermate Holdings.88 In Brown, the court imposed an issue preclusion
sanction on the defendant employer for failing to preserve relevant
information stored in the cloud. 89 The plaintiffs had sought various
categories of data from their former employer in order to substantiate their
age discrimination claims.90 In particular, the plaintiffs—who previously
worked as sales representatives at the company—requested their former
employer produce sales records maintained by the employer on cloud
provider Salesforce.com to establish that they either met or exceeded their

2012, LEGAL IT PROFESSIONALS 4, 7, available at
http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/cloudsurvey2012.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/HXK7-ZS2H (“[N]early all respondents acknowledged that cloud
computing would ultimately overtake on-premise computing in the legal industry.”);
SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-15.
86

See Philip Favro, ‘Mind Over Matters: Q & A with eDiscovery and Litigation Guru
Craig Ball, RECOMMIND (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.recommind.com/blog/q-ediscoverylitigation-guru-craig-ball, archived at http://perma.cc/4D7H-7ZTF (observing that most
lawyers generally lack the training and are unprepared to “preserve and produce data
stored with cloud providers, maintained on mobile devices, or exchanged on social
networking sites”).
87

See id.

88

Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., No. 2:11-cv-1122, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90123,
*4–6, *27 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2014).
89

Id. at *72–74.

90

Id. at *9–10, *70–71.
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sales quotas in comparison to younger employees.91
[29] While the employer’s counsel issued a “general directive” that
relevant documents be kept for litigation, neither the employer nor its
lawyers took meaningful follow-up steps to ensure the responsive cloudstored data was preserved.92 For example, the employer did not export the
requested data from Salesforce.com and neglected to back up that
information.93 Nor did the employer keep the plaintiffs’ Salesforce.com
account information. 94 Instead, it repurposed these accounts, thereby
enabling other employees to modify or revise the data. 95 Finally, the
employer did not ask Salesforce.com for a back-up of the requested
account data until after the cloud provider recycled the data pursuant to its
own retention schedule. 96 All of which compromised and spoliated the
requested information that ultimately could have established (or negated)
the plaintiffs’ claims.97
[30] Would a revised Rule 37(e) change the outcome in Brown? The
employer almost certainly would not have escaped sanctions under the
amended Rule since it “failed to take reasonable steps to preserve” 98 the
relevant Salesforce.com ESI and due to the lack of replacement
evidence. 99 Given the importance of the spoliated evidence to the
91

Id.

92

Id. at *56–58.

93

Id. at *24–26.

94

Brown, 2014 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 90123 at *21–23.

95

Id.

96

Id. at *57–58.

97

See id. at *72–74.

98

SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-56, B-60 to B-62.

99

See Brown, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90123, at *72–74.
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plaintiffs’ claims and the court’s other findings on the issues, 100 the issue
preclusion sanction would likely be an appropriate curative measure under
the updated version of Rule 37(e)(1).101
[31] Indeed, the new sanctions framework suggests the only change in
Brown might be in the gravity of the sanction issued against the employer.
Was the employer’s preservation failure tantamount to an “intent to
deprive”102 the plaintiffs of the Salesforce.com ESI under amended Rule
37(e)(2)? While the employer unquestionably allowed the ESI to be
destroyed, its conduct seems more akin to recklessness than bad faith,103
i.e., the purposeful concealment of adverse information.104 And yet, given
the ambiguity created by the draft committee note, such reckless conduct
arguably could satisfy the “intentional loss or destruction” language.105
[32] Though impossible to predict how a court would precisely rule in
this instance, it is clear that the new sanctions framework would not
dramatically change the analysis of the matter. In essence, courts will
continue to adjudicate ESI preservation failures—regardless of whether
they occur in the cloud or in more conventional storage locations—based
on the traditional notions of reasonableness and proportionality.106
100

See id. at 66–74.

101

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-55 to B-57, B-63 to B-64.

102

Id. at app. B-55 to -57, B-64 to B-67.

103

See Brown, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90123, at *69–70.

104

See Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998).

105

See SEPT. ‘14 REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B-65.

106

This line of reasoning appears to be equally applicable to ESI preservation failures on
mobile devices. See Philip Favro, The Impact of Cloud Computing and Mobile Devices
on Litigation Holds, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS (Jan. 2015), available at
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_legaltech/31_9a/news/the_impact_of_cl
oud_computing_and_mobile_devices_on_litigation_holds160645-1.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/MB8Z-FAQ8 (describing the preservation challenges associated with data
stored on mobile devices).
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V. CONCLUSION
[33] While not every issue associated with ESI preservation failures has
been addressed by the Rule 37(e) proposal, it is unrealistic to expect that
any rule could do so. Moreover, the revised rule appears to have resolved
many of the shortcomings with the current version. By creating a basic
analytical framework, widening the analysis to ensure a broad set of
factors are considered in connection with preservation conduct, and
establishing a uniform standard for severe sanctions, lawyers may finally
have a workable paradigm to provide straightforward advice to clients on
ESI preservation questions.
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